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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

TERMINATION OF A CONTINUING GUARANTY.-Several persons jointly and
severally guaranteed to.a bank the present and future obligations of a customer, stipulating that "the bank may grant extensions without lessening the
liability" of the guarantors, that "this shall be a continuing guaranty, and shall
cover -all the liabilities which the customer may incur or come under until
the undersigned, or the executors or administrators of the undersigned, shall
have given the bank notice in writing to make no further advances on the
security of this guaranty," and that "this guaranty shall not be affected by the
death of the undersigned." One of the guarantors died and his executor
wrote a letter "revoking the guaranty." Thereafter, the bank took renewals
of the obligations then current and made fresh advances. What are the
rights of the bank against the surviving guarantors and the executor of the
deceased?
This question was presented to the Supreme Court of Alberta in Northern
Crown Bank v. Woodcrafts Ltd. et al., ii Alberta L. R. I. It was held that
the executor's notice terniinated the guaranty as to him, so that he was not
liable for the fresh advances afterward made, but that, by reason of the
provision authorizing extensions, he was not discharged, in respect of advances already made, by the -renewals subsequently taken; and it was held
that the notice in no way affected the liability of the surviving guarantors.
No authority was cited except upon the last point. The executor and the.
surviving guarantors appealed to the Privy Council, whose judgment is
reported under the name of Egbert v. National Crown Bank, [i918] A. C.
903. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, but the opinion, by
Lord Dunedin, squarely places the 'lecision upon the ground that by the
terms of the guaranty it was to remain in full force as to all of the guarantors
"until there is noice given by each and all of the guarantors, the executors
of any deceased co-signatory coming in his place." No authorities were cited.

NOTE AND COMMENT
So far as concerns the liability of the surviving guarantors, the decision
is clearly right. The Privy Council's position, which is simply strict construction of the revocation clause, is unquestionably sound thus far, that this
clause does not reserve to each the power to revoke for all. Such reservation
might, of course, be made, but it can hardly be construed out of this or any
equally general stipulation, the interpretation naturally being confined to
giving to each that power which is necessary for his own protection. Neither
does the lower court's position, that the executor released himself, lead indirectly and through the general equities of suretyship to the release of the
others, for each has, by hypothesis, stipulated for just this sort of discharge
of his fellows. The case is clearly distinguishable from that of discharge of
a cosurety by act of the creditor. Beckett v. Addyman, 9 Q. B. D. 783.
The case of the executor, however, upon which the courts differed so
radically, is not equally clear. The Privy Council's construction of the
revocation clause, as requiring unanimous action, is extreme. The result is
harsh upon a guarantor who wishes to withdraw, but cannot secure the concurrence of all his brethren, and puts it in the power of. the principal to
collude with one guarantor against 'the rest. Again, it is objectionable to
hold the estate of a deceased surety indefinitely under a contingent liability
for future advances. Coulthart v. Clementson, 5 Q. B. D. 42; Gay v. Ward,
67 Conn. 147. We may assume that these considerations are not -of sufficient
weight to invalidate a specific provision in a guaranty requiring unanimousaction, but, when we have to construe a stipulation as general in its terms as
that before the court, we should resolve the doubt against the harsh and
impolitic interpreta tion. It is gubmitted that the Privy Council's position is
erroneous. It should be noted, however, that it cannot be relegated to the
limbo of obiter dicta, though it goes beyond the case presented on appeal,
for it supports the decision on the executor's liability for renewals, and is the
only thing in the opinion which does support that decision. It must also be
admitted 'that there is, apparently, no clear authority against it, though some
support for the lower court's release of the executor from the fresh advances
can be found. Coulthart v. Clementson, supra; Beckwith v. Addyman, supra;
Harris v. Fawcett, x5 Eq. 311, 8 Ch.. App. 866; Ashby v. Day, 54 L. T. 408;
Slagle v. Forney's Exr., 15 At. 427.
Assuming that the lower court was right in its construction of the guaranty
as reserving to the executor the power to terminate the guaranty as-to himself, so that lie was not liable for the fresh advances, a nice question remains
as to whether he should have been he)d liable for the prior advances subsequently renewed. This, too, resolves itself into a problem in construction.
It would seem that, as a general rule, the revocation'of a continuing guaranty,
whether by notice or by death, has the effect of destroying its continuing
character and converting it into a simple guaranty *ofthe 'then obligations of
the principal. From this it follows that a subsequent renewal of these obligations constitutes an extension of time, with the usual result. Gay v. Ward,
supra; National Eagle Bank v. Hunt, i6 R. I. 148. Compare Williams v.
Reynolds, jI La. 230: Wise v. Miller, 45 Oh. St. 388. In our case, however,
extensions were explicitly authorized by the guaranty and, if-this authoriza-
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tion survived the notice of revocation, the renewals are, of course, binding.
We may assume-that such an authorization might by explicit stipulation be
made perpetual, though this would be open to some objections on the score
of policy. Assuming this, the question comes to one of construction of the
-two clauses, the one authorizing extensions, the other reserving a power
of revocation. Does the latter overreach the former, -or does , it not? The
phraseology of this particular instrument is not significant, and there is little
or nothing to vary the question as to how, in general, clauses of this type
should be construed. One would like to limit the over-technical doctrine of
discharge by extension of time, denying its application in any case from
which it can be fairly excluded, as it can here by liberal interpretation of the
extension clause. And one can argue that, in a continuing guaranty, such
an extension clause is mere surplusage if it applies only to extensions preceeding revocation. On the other hand, it may be said that the fault with
the rule on discharge by extension is simply that it is too rigid, and that the
remedy is not to arbitrarily exclude it from any case but to reform it by
requiring negligence or bad faith on the part of the creditor and injury to the
surety; but that here the stipulations either authorize all extensions or, being
revoked, authorize none. It may be argued that, if this extension clause is not
revocable by each upon notice, it is not revocable at all, for the revocation
clause does not contemplate more than one kind of revocation; but, if the
extension clause is irrevocable, this constitutes an unwholesome state of
affairs. It is harsh upon the guarantors. It is objectionable in its effect upon
the administration of the estates of deceased guarantors. It puts it in the
power of the principal and creditor to make the guaranty a permanent foundation of credit over which, at the expense of the sureties, current business
might be conducted indefinitely. The authorities upon this problem are as
nicely balanced as the arguments. The decision of the Supreme Court of
Alberta in our case, systaining the extension clause, cannot be said to have
been reversed by the Privy Council, for the latter simply carried farther the
strict construction of the revocation clause. On the other hand, in a case
practically identical with ours, though involving implied power of revocation
by death and notice, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the
extension clause was revoked. National Eagle Bank v. Hunt, supra.
Possibly there is intermediate ground between these positions. We might
hold that power of revocation by notice was here waived, as to extensions, and
that power of revocation could be waived altogether, but that a perpetual
continuing guaranty, either for new advances or for extensions, is contrary
t9 public policy and cannot be tolerated, and that in cases where it is necessary, upon a bill filed for that purpose, a continuing guaranty can be wound
up and discharged by decree of court. We find no more direct authority for
such a proceeding than the familiar suits for exoneration, and, more remotely
related, the whole body of equitable interference in the suretyship relat;on.
E. N. D.
But is that not enough?

